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The Sherman Act 1 by its terms forbids "every contract, combina-
tion ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states . - Although Congress has exempted from the statute
particular segments of the business community,3 the Act generally en-
sures that competition, as the guiding principle in economic affairs,4
will remain the national policy.5
In Parker v. Brown,0 the Supreme Court excepted a state agricul-
tural proration program from the reach of the Sherman Act. Although
the Supremacy Clause7 generally gives effect to federal policy over
conflicting state policy, the Parker doctrine recognizes the state policy
instead.8 The apparent anomaly of Parker has capsed considerable
1. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
2. Id. § 1. This language has been interpreted to forbid only "unreasonable restraints."
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). This interpretation, the "rule of
reason," refers to the "common law" or case-by-case process of defining rules carried on
by the courts in antitrust cases.
It is not possible to define precisely a "reasonable" restraint. Some restraints are per
se unreasonable, e.g., horizontal price fixing. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969). Other
restraints are unreasonable only in so far as their market effects are such as to suppress or
destroy competition. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). See generally
ATr'Y GEN.'s NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws, REPORT (1955) [hereinafter cited
as REPORT].
3. The congressional exemption may take one of two forms. The exemption may allow
specific groups to organize. See, e.g., Clayton Act § 6, ch. 25, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970); Capper-Volstead Act § 1, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1970).
These exemptions have been interpreted by the courts to allow only the legitimate
ends of organizing per se. If the organized group then contracts, combines or conspires
with nonexempt persons or groups, they will be liable for a violation of the antitrust
laws. E.g., UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers
Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S.
797, 809 (1945); United States v. Borden Co., 36 U.S. 188 (1939); cf. Case-Swayne Co. v.
Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967).
The second form is an exemption under specified circumstances for regulated in-
dustries. For example, the statute establishing a regulatory agency may allow the agency,
after public hearings and specified findings, to approve actions (e.g., mergers) which would
otherwise be violations of the antitrust laws. E.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§
5(1), 5(11), 5b (1970); Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1378 (1970). In other cases,
Congress has specified that the antitrust laws are applicable only in so far as the industry
is not subject to regulation by the state. E.g., McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012-13
(1970) (insurance); Fair Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
4. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
5. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
6. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
7. U.S. Coxs'r. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. In this Note, the "Parker doctrine" refers only to those instances where a state
policy is challenged under the federal antitrust laws. Although Parker is often cited,
cases dealing with the relationship between federal agencies and the federal antitrust
statutes present a different issue. Congress may change or limit its own policies without
raising federalism or Supremacy Clause issues. See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d
931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972). In federal regulatory cases the
issue is one of primary jurisdiction and deference to agency findings. Otter Tail Power
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confusion among courts and commentators, and the Court has as yet
failed to provide clear standards for the application of the doctrine. 9
This Note will examine the Parker doctrine by means of a preemp-
tion analysis under the Supremacy Clause. The facts and opinion in
Parker itself will first be presented. A general framework for pre-
emption analysis will then be developed and applied to the federal
antitrust laws. Finally, after a criticism of the traditional "state ac-
tion" interpretation, the Parker defense will be explained in terms
of the suggested preemption analysis.
I. The Parker Case
The California Raisin Proration Program, implemented under the
State Agricultural Proration Act, was designed to stabilize the market
in raisins and to maintain prices during a period of economic crisis.
Brown, a producer-dealer, had sold short on the market in 1941, be-
lieving that the price of raisins would decline from its high level as
farmers were forced to dump a large crop on the market. Brown
attempted to forestall the price maintenance effects of the proration
program by filing suit in federal district court to enjoin enforcement
of the program. A three-judge district court ruled in Brown's favor,10
but the Supreme Court unanimously reversed that decision, holding
that the program did not violate the Sherman Act,"' was not preempted
Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States v. ICC, 396 U.S. 491 (1970). In
the state cases, there is the underlying constitutional issue of the distribution of power
within the federal system and the authority of Congress to impose regulations on the
sovereign states. These cases do not present the problem of conflicting congressional
policies, but rather the more difficult issue of federal-state relations. For cases involving
federal agencies and the antitrust laws, see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410
U.S. 366 (1973) (FPC); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363
(1973) (CAB); United States v. ICC, 396 U.S. 491 (1970); Denver & R.G.W. R.R. v. United
States, 387 U.S. 485 (1967) (ICC); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963)
(SEC); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) (CAB);
California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962); United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334 (1959) (FCC);
Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 498 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir. 1974) (SEC); Thill Sec. Corp. v.
New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971) (SEC).
See generally Fox, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: A Reappraisal of the
Role of the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine, 2 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 279 (1972); Petrucelli &
Long, Antitrust and the Regulated Industries: The Role of the "Doctrine" of Primary
Jurisdiction, 1969 U. TOL. L. REV. 303; Stelzer, Antitrust and Regulatory Policies: An
Introduction and Overview, 16 ANTITRUsT BULL. 669, 671-72 (1971); Note, Regulated In-
dustries and the Antitrust Laws: Substantive and Procedural Coordination, 58 COLUm. L.
REV. 673 (1958).
9. An opportunity for clarification by the Court came last term in United States v.
Pacific Southwest Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed pursuant to
Rule 60, 414 U.S. 801 (1973). The Court has continued to refuse certiorari in other cases
in this field. But see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d I (4th Cir.), cert. granted,
95 S. Ct. 223 (1974); Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing
Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71, 74 n.13 (1974).
10. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
11. 317 US. at 350-52.
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by the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937,12 and did not impose an
undue burden on interstate commerce. 13 In his Sherman Act analysis,
Chief Justice Stone assumed arguendo that the proration program
would have been illegal if established by private persons.' 4 However,
the Court ruled that the Sherman Act was inapplicable to the situation
presented in Parker, because Congress had never intended to restrain
or regulate "state action"5:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or
its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.
The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate program made
no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in re-
straint of trade or to establish a monopoly but, as sovereign,
imposed a restraint as an act of government which the Sherman
Act did not undertake to prohibit. 0
Based on Parker, a broad antitrust defense became available if the
challenged activity were at all regulated by the state.' 7 The lower
courts, left with little specific guidance, have disagreed on the ap-
plication of the Parker doctrine.' 8
12. Id. at 352-59.
13. Id. at 359-67.
14. Id. at 350. The issue of a Parker defense does not arise where the challenged
governmental action would not be illegal if done by private parties. Therefore, this Note
will deal only with those situations in which the federal antitrust laws would be at least
arguably applicable if private parties engaged in the conduct at issue.
Where the state acts in a proprietary rather than governmental capacity, somewhat
different issues are involved. Consideration of this problem is beyond the scope of this
Note. But see Slater, supra note 9, at 89 (treats the issue of the state as a proprietor as a
limitation on the Parker doctrine).
15. 317 U.S. at 350-51. The Court assumed that Congress could constitutionally
prohibit a state from mandating a stabilization program, but held that it had not done
so in passing the Sherman Act. Id. at 350-54.
16. Id. at 350-52. See Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1904).
17. Even where there is a comprehensive scheme, however, a Parker defense will not be
allowed if the regulatory decisions are based on false information given by one of
the parties. See Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972). Another important limitation on the
right of the state to impose regulations is that all parties must be treated equally by the
regulatory agency. See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
18. Compare Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.
1959), and Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969),
with Gaslight Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1062 (1972).
For an analysis which attempts to explain the cases following Parker in terms of the
degree of state action involved, see Teply, Governmental Antitrust Immunity, 48 TUL. L.
REV. 272 (1974). See also Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State
Regulations, 39 A.B.A. ANTITRUsr L.J. 950, 958-60 (1970); Kirkpatrick, The State Action
Antitrust Immunity Defense, 23 Am. U.L. REV. 527 (1974); Posner, The Proper Relation-
ship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 693
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Two essential issues remain to be satisfactorily resolved. The first
is what degree of state action or involvement is required to establish
a Parker defense. The second is an explanation of why a state should
be allowed to take anticompetitive action that is foreclosed to a pri-
vate party. The resolution of both issues may be found in a pre-
emption analysis of the Sherman Act.
II. The Doctrine of Preemption
Preemption is a judicially created doctrine based on the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution.19 By giving primacy to federal law, it en-
sures that congressional policy will not be defeated by inconsistent
state policies; where Congress has chosen to act, federal law will not
be rendered ineffective by disagreement among the states. In this way,
the doctrine of preemption historically helped to establish a federal
union that would be cemented not only by trade, but also by com-
mon policies. 20
The preemption analysis proceeds by a series of interrelated steps.
The first step is to identify the field in which the challenged state
law operates or has its effects, and to determine whether there is a
federal policy or law also operating in that field. 21 The determination
(1974); Simmons & Fornaciari, State Regulation as an Antitrust Defense: An Analysis of
the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 61 (1974); Slater, supra note 9; Note,
Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules and the Antitrust Laws, 1974 DuKE L.J. 1164,
1211-26; Note, The Limits of State Regulation Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 42
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 427 (1974); Note, Parker v. Brown-Gone to Hecht: A New Test for
the State Action Exemption, 24 HAsT. L.J. 287 (1973); Note, Debate on State Versus
Federal Regulation of Insurance Continues, 53 NEB. L. REV. 289 (1974); Note, Participant
Governmental Action Immunity from the Antitrust Laws: Fact or Fiction?, 50 TEXAS L.
REV. 474 (1972); 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1245 (1973).
19. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cI. 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; .... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
State regulation, of course, is open to challenge on grounds other than preemption,
and often courts will deal with those grounds before reaching the preemption issue. The
regulation, in order to be valid as an exercise of police power, must be related to the
public health, safety, or morals, must not be unreasonable or arbitrary, and must have a
rational relation to the purported evil being remedied. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133
(1894); Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896).
Nor can such a regulation be a burden on interstate commerce, aside from the anti-
trust implications. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Dean Milk Co. v.
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407
U.S. 258 (1972).
20. See 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §§ 1839-40, at 582-83 (2d ed.
1873). See generally I J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §§ 228-32, 248-53, at
215-19 (2d ed. 1873); THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (A. Hamilton).
21. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941).
1167
The Yale Law Journal
of the field of the state law and of a potentially competing federal
law are both questions of law to be decided by the court.22
The next step in the analysis focuses upon the federal statute or
policy. The court must decide whether the federal regulation was
intended to be exclusive. The statute may expressly or by necessary
implication indicate that exclusivity is required.23 Alternatively, the
subject matter of the statute may reflect a need for exclusive federal
supervision or national uniformity.24 Finally, the federal scheme may
be so pervasive or comprehensive that it precludes the coexistence of
state regulation. 25 If the federal policy or law is exclusive, no further
inquiry is made: necessarily the state policy is voided.2 6
If the federal policy is found not to be exclusive, however, the
court proceeds to the third step. Here the judge must first ascertain
the substance and scope of the policy intended by Congress,2= and
then, determine whether the state program "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress." 28 The state policy will be voided in so far as it blocks
the effectiveness of the federal policy. Where performance of both
standards is impossible, the state standard must give way.29 Even if
legitimate state interests compel a more stringent policy, the state
regulation may stand only to the extent that the federal policy will
not be defeated.30
A comparison of the cases and close reading within single decisions
indicate the importance of the third step: identifying the federal pur-
pose and scope.3' The identification of the policy directs the court's
22. Id.
23. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52 (1941).
24. Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (noise regulation by
the CAB); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (discharge from bankruptcy); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941). But see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (patent law does not
preempt state trade secrets laws); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (copyright
laws do not preempt state laws punishing "record piracy").
25. Local 496, Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (labor laws); Northern States Power Co. v.
Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), affd without opinion, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972)
(Atomic Energy Comm'n regulations).
26. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
27. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
28. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1962), quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
29. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1962).
30. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 445 (1960) (city regulation
protecting air quality not preempted by the Federal Boiler Inspection Act.and not a
burden on interstate commerce).
31. Compare Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960), and Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1962), with Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
For an analysis of these problems from another perspective in relation to Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, see Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 1553 (1974).
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inquiry to the potential conflicts between the federal policy and the
effects of the state program.
III. A Preemption Analysis of the Federal Antitrust Laws
The Parker defense raises the issue of the relationship between
state and federal power. The federal antitrust laws have been inter-
preted as establishing a paramount national policy in favor of com-
petition.32 Yet Parker allows state intervention which seemingly con-
flicts with that policy. A preemption analysis applied to the antitrust
laws provides a framework for resolving the apparent anomaly.
The initial step in this analysis is to decide if a conflict may exist
between the state and the federal regulation. To do this, the court
must determine: first, whether the state is involved and, if so, the
field of operation of the state program; and, second, whether the
federal antitrust laws operate in the same field. The presence of state
involvement, though ultimately a legal conclusion, is essentially a
factual issue to be determined by the court in each case upon proof
or judicial notice.33 Various state programs-including the regulation
of utility rates,3 4 insurance premiumsa 5 agricultural production 36 and
fees charged by professionals37 -operate to affect the prices paid by
consumers for goods and services, and are thus potential antitrust vio-
lations. As a matter of statutory construction, the federal antitrust
laws, although broad in scope, will apply to the activity only where
the alleged restraint has significant effects on interstate commerce. 38
32. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
218 (1947); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
33. See, e.g., Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248,
252 (4th Cir. 1971) (silence of a state regulatory agency in not citing a plan as a violation
of its regulations interpreted as approval, thereby establishing state involvement). This
factual finding may vary from case to case, despite similar types of state regulation.
Compare Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., supra (agency ap-
proval by means of silent acquiescence is sufficient state action to allow a Parker defense),
with International Tel. &. Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 351 F. Supp.
1153, 1202 (D. Hawaii 1972) (specific approval by local utility commissions of common
ownership of both manufacturing and "distributing" arms of telephone service not
sufficient state action).
34. See, e.g., Gaslight Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co.,
438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
35. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa.
1969).
36. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
37. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct.
223 (1974); United States v. Oregon State Bar, 43 U.S.L.W. 2234 (D. Ore. Dec. 10, 1974);
United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 43 U.S.L.W. 2269 (D. Colo. Jan. 7,
1975).
38. The issue of the effect of the restraint on interstate commerce is a question of
fact. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); White Motor Co.
v. United States, 372 US. 253 (1963). As a matter of statutory interpretation, the antitrust
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Where a possible conflict is posed by the operation in the same field
of both the state program and the antitrust laws, the court must pro-
ceed to the next step in the preemption analysis and determine whether
the federal interest is exclusive.
The antitrust laws are not an exclusive system of regulation to the
extent of completely forbidding any state regulation. Neither the legis-
lative history of the Sherman Act nor the opinions of the Court re-
quire the Sherman Act to be exclusive of all other regulation. 39 For
example, states may pass their own antitrust laws.40 Rather, the anti-
trust laws are an interstitial system, an attempt to regulate competition
as one aspect of economic life.41 The limitation on state regulation,
therefore, is that of inconsistency of result, so that the state activity
will be invalid under the Supremacy Clause only if it interferes with
the federal policy.
42
As evolved through judicial interpretation, the federal antitrust
laws promote three general policies: to preserve competition and thus
maintain allocative efficiency; to preserve competition and thus pro-
tect consumers by ensuring adequate quality at a fair price; and to
preserve small competitors, both as a noneconomic social goal and
as a means of approximating the "perfect market." 43 All of these goals
may be served so long as the market is functioning properly. How-
ever, in a variety of situations the market may break down and make
simultaneous achievement of all the goals impossible, e.g., where poor
economic conditions temporarily prevent competition from creating
sufficient demand at an adequate price; 44 where there is a natural
laws will not apply to activity that is local in nature. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp
Paving Co., 95 S. Ct. 392 (1974) (Robinson-Patman Act does not apply to certain suppliers
of paving material because they were not "in [interstate] commerce" within the meaning
of the Act). In fact, Parker-type regulatory activity may often be intrastate in its effects.
See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047
(1972). In addition to being attacked under the Sherman Act, a state regulation that has
interstate effects may also be challenged as a burden on interstate commerce. See Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
39. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRuST ANALYSIS 115 (2d ed. 1974); Note, The Commerce Clause
and State Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1469 (1961); Mosk, State Antitrust
Enforcement and Coordination with Federal Enforcement, 21 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEcTrON
RaP. 358, 367 (1962).
40. See Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909); Peoples Say. Bank v.
Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 102 N.W.2d 777 (1960); Texas v. Southeast Texas Chap., Nat'l
Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 358 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v.
Local 542, Warehousemen, 163 Cal. App. 2d 771, 330 P.2d 53 (1968); P. AREEDA, supra
note 39, at 115.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 310 (1948); Hiland Dairy,
Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969).
42. See generally Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972);
note 28 supra.
43. See Bork, Bowman, Blake & Jones, Goals of Antitrust-A Dialogue on Policy, 65
COLUM. L. Rav. 363 (1965); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1960).
44. E.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 US. 341 (1943). The result in this situation is to drive
out small competitors who are unable to survive the crisis. In rare circumstances, the
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monopoly, so that the service can be profitably provided by a private
party only if competition is controlled;45 or where high barriers to
entry or limit pricing by a dominant market firm prevent viable
competition.
46
The federal courts are generally responsible for determining whether
the policies of the federal antitrust laws are being served. In those
circumstances, however, where the three general policies cannot all
be met, a choice among them must be made. The federal judiciary
has neither guidance from Congress nor any particular expertise to
determine which of the several goals is most important in a particular
situation.
The federal system contemplates states as sovereigns within their
spheres of authority, and comity must be shown to them.47 That does
not mean that all state programs must be recognized, but rather that
the federal courts should be reluctant to void a reasonable state policy
as inconsistent with a superior federal interest. The federal policy
which is thought applicable must be clearly endangered by the state
act. Such is the teaching of preemption. Where the various goals of
the federal antitrust laws cannot be simultaneously achieved, so that
a choice among them is necessary, the decision by a state to effectuate
one of the recognized federal policies should not be considered inconsis-
tent with paramount federal law. Therefore, such state activity is ex-
empt because it is in fact not contrary to the underlying federal
policy. Moreover, the action of a state in such a situation provides
Court has recognized that this economic situation may justify private action which would
otherwise be violative of the Sherman Act. This explains the seemingly inconsistent
results in Appalachian Coals and Socony-Vacuum. Compare Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), with United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S.
150 (1940). In each case, the economic situation was poor, with high production causing-
low prices. In each case, producers attempted to band together to reduce output and
maintain prices. But Appalachian involved a program designed to help small producers
who would otherwise be driven from the market, leaving it to a few large producers.
Socony was a program designed by large producers to maintain a price which was being
undercut by small producers. Thus, where small competitors were helped to survive in
a period of economic difficulty, the Court upheld the program despite its effects on price
and output; but where the program protected large sellers from price competition by
small sellers, and the economic situation would not have caused the demise of the small
competitors, the Court invalidated the anticompetitive program.
45. E.g., Gaslight Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d
248 (4th Cir. 1971); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp.,
351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Hawaii 1972). In this situation, where the entry of competitors is
severely limited, the only restraints on the price of the service to the consumer are those
provided by state regulation and the demand curve of the product.
46. See Note, Telex v. IBM: Monopoly Pricing under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
84 YALE L.J. 558 (1975).
47. The states are sovereign save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from
their authority. 317 U.S. at 351. The Tenth Amendment is, at the very least, a declara-
tion that reserved powers do exist in the states. U.S. CONsT. amend. X. See United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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the opinion of a decisionmaker neutral between the consumer and
the competitors as to which interest will be protected.48 Such a policy
determination is legislative in character and better left to those re-
sponsible for "political" judgments.49
The federal courts are still able to prevent the abuse of state power,
for they must pass on whether there in fact exists a situation where
all of the antitrust policies cannot be fulfilled. However, where its
decision does not result in an undue burden on interstate commerce,
the state is allowed to act because the choice is better made there.
The question of whether the state is involved, and the extent of
the state involvement, were partial approaches to this question: wheth-
er in fact a neutral, sovereign state had made a choice among the
federal policies. But they ignored the issue of whether the situation
was one in which such a choice was necessary. The analysis under
the preemption doctrine enables the court to face both issues squarely,
and still leaves to the states an appropriate authority to regulate
economic affairs.
It thus becomes apparent that in applying the preemption analysis,
the court must look beyond the face of the statutes involved to the
market characteristics in the particular situation. Only by examining
the actual circumstances can the court determine whether the state
policy may stand, because it in fact reflects a political choice among
conflicting federal antitrust policies.
48. There is of course an underlying assumption here that state governments are not
controlled by any single special interest, but that the powers of the voters and the com-
peting voices of various special interests create an approximation of a neutral decision in
the public interest.
49. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962); cf. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039,
1042-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
Where state activity is found to be preempted by the Sherman Act, and thus subject
to its proscriptions, other issues beyond the scope of this Note arise. Not all state activity
subject to the antitrust laws would necessarily be voided thereby; rather, the activity would
be subject to the rule of reason. See note 2 supra. In making determinations about the
reasonableness of state activity, courts should not be bound to come to the same results
that they would reach if private parties had acted in a similar manner. The antitrust
laws are "common law" in nature; that is, Congress has set only general guidelines,
allowing the policy to be filled in by the courts on a case-by-case basis. See United
States v. Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805, 812 (E.D. Mich. 1945); P. AREEDA, supra
note 39, at 4. One factor to be considered in applying tie rule of reason in this area is
that a sovereign state rather than a private party has engaged in the conduct. Professor
S. Paul Posner has developed a partial rationale for treating a state as subject to the
antitrust laws but judging its acts by a more lenient standard than private action. Posner,
supra note 18, at 705-07, 712, 721-27.
Any analysis of state activity under the rule of reason, whether treating it more leniently
or in the same manner as private conduct, must make the determination of whether the
state activity is reasonable both in general and as applied in the particular situation.
Indeed, such decisions are already made under the existing Parker doctrine, for state
activity has been held subject to the federal antitrust laws where courts have found error
in either the agency's judgment or the information presented to it. See United States v.
Pacific Southwest Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed pursuant to
Rule 60, 414 U.S. 801 (1973); Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
1172
Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis
IV. The Parker Defense and the Doctrine of Preemption
The traditional interpretation of Parker is framed in jurisdictional
terms. Under this approach, Parker is read to hold, as a matter of
statutory construction, that a state and its officials are not within the
intended reach of the Sherman Act.50 Because the suit in Parker was
brought against the state to enjoin enforcement of its agricultural
proration program, such a jurisdictional decision would have been
sufficient to dispose of the case. 51 However, the Court did not nar-
rowly limit its analysis to the issue of whether a state was a "person"
within the meaning of the federal statute.52 The Court also noted
that it was not faced with a situation in which a state had authorized
or participated in private conduct violative of the Sherman Act.a3 If
a state were not within the Act on jurisdictional grounds, the fact
of joining a private conspiracy would be of no concern.54
In addition to these difficulties with the Court's opinion, the
jurisdictional theory of Parker is unsatisfactory for other reasons.
First, the Court in Parker failed to give any guidance as to the type
of state activity or the degree of state involvement required to es-
tablish the defense,55 which may indicate that the Court did not per-
ceive the issue in terms of "state action." 5ao Moreover, because of this
lack of guidance from the Court, the jurisdictional theory has resulted
in considerable confusion and uncertainty in the case law. Some courts
have upheld the defense even though the state was involved only to a
limited extent.57 On the other hand, not all state action is held to
50. Slater, supra note 9, at 73.
51. It is also clear that Congress did not have state agencies in mind when it passed
the Sherman Act. The era of government agencies was just beginning: the interstate
Commerce Commission, the first of the federal regulatory agencies, was not founded
until 1887, just three years prior to the passage of the Sherman Act. Instead, congressional
attention was focused on the possibilities of domination of the economy by private
business combinations. See 317 U.S. at 351.
52. Id. at 350-52.
53. Id. at 351-52.
54. Note the parallel between the suggestion in Parker that the state would lose its
exemption by joining a private conspiracy and decisions in other areas of the antitrust
laws, holding that exempted persons become subject to the antitrust laws once they join
conspiracies with nonexempt parties. See, e.g., Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325
U.S. 797 (1945); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); United States v. Borden Co.,
308 U.S. 188, 204 (1939); Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967).
However, such a parallel ultimately proves to be misleading.. In the above cases, the
exempt party was clearly subject to the antitrust laws, except in so far as their organiza-
tional activities were specifically protected. See note 3 supra. The determination that a
state is not a person within the meaning of the Sherman Act, however, would seem to
remove states absolutely from the prohibition of the Act. It is unclear why joining a
conspiracy would convert the state into a "person" within the meaning of the Act.
55. See Slater, supra note 9, at 73-74 n.13.
56. Where the Court has been concerned with such problems in other cases, it has
given clearer definition than in Parker as to what action is required or exempted. See,
e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
57. See, e.g., Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248
(4th Cir. 1971).
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be exempt, and the defense has been disallowed for activity that had
clearly been approved by the state5 8 Finally, the "jurisdictional"
antitrust exemption would apply only to the state or its officers, and
would be inapplicable in suits against private parties. However, the
lower federal courts have greatly expanded the Parker defense to in-
clude private persons involved in regulated industries,r9 and this
broader doctrine seems too well established to allow a return to such
a narrow reading. °
These difficulties may be avoided if Parker is read in preemption
terms. 61 Parker arose during a time of severe economic crisis and over-
production. Without the agricultural proration program it could rea-
sonably have been assumed that the low prices occasioned by the large
raisin crop would have destroyed or seriously harmed a number of
producers.6 2 The proration program, by stabilizing the market and
maintaining prices, was thus aimed at protecting the number of com-
58. See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); United States v. Pacific Southwest
Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 414 U.S. 801
(1967). In each case the court disregarded the action of a state commission charged with
regulating the industry in question.
59. See, e.g., Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248
(4th Cir. 1971); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 351
F. Supp. 1153 (D. Hawaii 1972); Gaslight Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972). This expansion may be explained as a reluctance
on the part of courts to hold a business person liable under federal statutes for obeying
state law. See note 73 infra.
60. See Posner, supra note 18, at 697; Slater, supra note 9, at 73, 78; Teply, supra
note 18, at 274.
61. Parker was argued in the Supreme Court as a preemption case. In the district
court, plaintiff Brown had contended that the proration program was unconstitutional
as a burden on interstate commerce. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court solely on this ground, but during oral
argument several Justices raised the issue of conflicts with federal laws: the Sherman
Act, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 1, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The case
was set for reargument, and supplementary briefs were filed addressing the Sherman Act
issue. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 35-67; Supplemental Brief for Appellee at
2-29. The Solicitor General argued in detail that the proration program had been pre-
empted by the Sherman Act. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 52-66. The
parties also discussed the question of preemption, although not to the same extent as the
Solicitor General. See Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 38-39, 47-48; Supplemental
Brief for Appellee at 27-28, 55. Much of the Court's language in its Sherman Act analysis
seems clearly to be in response to these preemption arguments. 317 U.S. at 350-52.
62. In Parker, the state agricultural proration program was consistent with and in
fact supported by the federal Agricultural Adjustment Marketing Act. 317 U.S. at 352-59.
Some commentators have therefore explained Parker on the basis that Congress had
itself implied an exemption by creating a federal policy with similar effects. See, e.g., P.
AREEDA, supra note 39, at 57; Slater, supra note 9, at 86. However, it is questionable that
the intention of Congress in passing the Adjustment Act was to create an antitrust
exemption for state programs. Moreover, such an explanation does not touch upon the
Court's broad language in its Sherman Act analysis, which has been read 'to apply to
many situations where there was no comparable federal policy in support of the state
regulation. Whatever value such an explanation has for Parker as an individual case, it
has little, if any, value for explaining the Parker doctrine's continued vitality under other
circumstances. See id. at 87.
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petitors in the market. This policy of preserving viable competitors
is a legitimate goal under the Sherman Act. 3 However, if the state
had merely declared illegal action to be legal, or if the state had
joined a private agreement to restrain trade, it would not have been
furthering a Sherman Act policy and could have been held in violation
of the act.
4
The cases after Parker may also be analyzed in preemption terms.
Utility regulation cases are a prime example. 3 A public utility gen-
erally operates in a field where competition would not result in ade-
quate service at a return sufficient to support more than one seller.,0
The public utility is thus a clear example of a "natural monopoly." 67
The state, usually by means of an administrative agency or commis-
sion, undertakes to control the monopoly and regulate its prices. This
regulation furthers the Sherman Act policies of preserving allocative
efficiency and ensuring.fair prices for consumers.68 The state en-
forces a price close to the monopoly's costs while allowing a reason-
able return on capital, thus minimizing resource misallocation due
to monopoly profits and protecting consumers by maintaining the
service at lower prices.
Of course, a state may not be able to further every goal of the anti-
trust laws at the same time. Thus, protecting the number of com-
petitors, as in Parker, may not result in the lowest market price.09
Since the Sherman Act recognizes several goals, the promotion by the
state of any one of them should be sufficient where every goal cannot
be simultaneously achieved. Where, however, the state cannot justify
its program by any of the antitrust policies, the state regulation should
not establish a Parker defenseY0
63. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (Clayton Act); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
64. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 389 (1951).
65. See, e.g., Gaslight Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co.,
438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Electronics
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Hawaii 1972).
66. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 191 (1959). See generally Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 387 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
67. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 66, at 191.
68. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236
(1948). See generally Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 458 (1940).
69. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); EV. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v.
Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal.),
cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 801 (1973). In this case, state agency approval of the merger of
two intrastate carriers was held by the court to be insufficient to establish a Parker
defense. Although the court applied the "state action" theory of Parker, the result is
consistent with preemption analysis. No competitors were being saved by the merger,
and consumers would have suffered a cutback in services. Nor was it clear that the
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Analyzing the Parker defense in terms of preemption has several
advantages. It provides an analytical structure with which courts are
already familiar, instead of attempting, without clear guidance, to
define the required level of "valid government action." It also gives
the proper weight to the paramount federal interest. Where the market
is functioning, a state policy which prevents competition should not,
under the Supremacy Clause, be exempt from the federal antitrust
laws, no matter what the level of state involvement. On the other
hand, where the market mechanism has broken down and the state
responds in a way compatible with the underlying antitrust policies,
the preemption analysis permits the federal courts to defer to the ex-
pertise of state agencies and to recognize the legitimate economic
interests which the state is seeking to protect3' Finally, because it
establishes a clear and consistent theoretical basis for the Parker doc-
trine, the preemption analysis has the advantage of providing cer-
tainty and predictability in the law.72 This will improve the quality
of judicial decisions, limit the discretion of the judges, and make
lower court opinions more amenable to meaningful appellate review.
It will also allow business persons to plan and conduct their affairs
in an informed and intelligent manner.73
merger would prevent the misallocation of resources, since prices were already regulated
by the state agency. Since the merger thus did not effectuate any policy of the federal
antitrust laws, the action of the state agency was preempted and therefore did not justify
a Parker defense.
71. See Posner, supra note 18, at 697, 712, 738.
72. The Court's decisions in Eastern R.R. Presidents' Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), are not incon-
sistent with the suggested preemption analysis, even though some state action would be
subject to the federal antitrust laws. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects the right
under the First Amendment to petition for redress of grievances and to seek to affect
legislative or agency action. The doctrine has never been held to protect the subsequent
legislation or decision from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, the antitrust laws, or
other statutory or constitutional provision. See Simmons & Fornaciari, supra note 18, at
98. On the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, see California Motor Transport v. Trucking Un-
limited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (First Amendment protection of access to administrative
agencies does not include mere shams to deter and harass competition); Sacramento
Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local 150, 440 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826
(1971); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (restricting the Noerr-Pennington rule to access to policy-
makers and refusing to allow immunity for threats and coercion).
73. A business person faced with the conflicting demands of state and federal law is
in a difficult position. However, this problem is not a new one created by the preemption
analysis, but rather already exists under the presently prevailinginterpretation of Parker.
Indeed, the problem is more acute now because of the failure to provide clear standards
for applying the Parker defense, and the fact that the failure to make out the defense
results in the imposition of liability. See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
The preemption analysis will better enable the business person to judge whether the
state regulation is valid under the federal antitrust laws. Moreover, good faith reliance
on the state regulation need not result in the imposition of treble damages. See Posner,
supra note 18, at 735-39. Absent a defense of good faith reliance, the severe sanction of
treble damages under federal law might well force the business person to violate the
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Conclusion
This Note has examined the shortcomings of the prevailing "state
action" interpretation of the Parker doctrine. Such a theory allows
states to approve activities violative of the federal antitrust laws with-
out according sufficient importance to those interests protected by
the antitrust laws. Moreover, there are no standards by which to de-
termine the types or levels of state involvement necessary to establish
a Parker defense.
These shortcomings may be avoided by examining Parker in terms
of a preemption analysis. The preemption analysis is based on the
recognition that, while in most situations a competitive market will
serve the federal interests of protecting consumers, preserving com-
petitors and efficiently allocating resources, there are some circum-
stances where not all of these goals can be achieved. In those in-
stances, it is legitimate for the state to choose which goal will- be
fostered, even at the expense of competition. Such an analysis avoids
the analytical difficulties presented by the state action theory of Parker,
allows state regulation of appropriate economic areas, and ensures
that the interests embodied in the federal antitrust laws will be pro-
tected. It is time for the Court to take a case presenting these issues
and decide it clearly, so that lower federal courts, states and the
business community will be guided.
7 4
state statute or order. However, this seems fundamentally unfair, especially since state
penalties are likely to be immediate and certain. The violation of state law would also
interfere with the need for the smooth and uninterrupted operation of industries reg-
ulated by the state, particularly public utilities. Therefore, a defense of good faith
reliance should be allowed. Damages would be imposed only for acts done after a
judicial decision provided notice to the parties and to the state that the regulation was
invalid. Id. at 728-32. Such an approach has some support in antitrust case law. See Case-
Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 396-400 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring
and dissenting) (although Sunkist's exemption from the antitrust laws was found by the
Court to be no longer applicable, Harlan urged that only future liability should be im-
posed because of the prior judicial approval of the Sunkist plan). Nor is criminal liability
a real danger. Criminal prosecutions under the Sherman Act are rare, and the imposition
of criminal penalties requires a "willful" violation. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 350; P.
AREEDA, supra note 39, at 49-55. Good faith reliance on the state regulation should not
and probably would not result in criminal sanctions. But here, as in the Noerr-Pennington
area, see note 72 supra, bad faith or sham reliance on the state regulation in order to
create unreasonable restraints of trade should be punishable.
74. The issue was argued to the court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1
(4th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 223 (1974). The issue may arise in a consolidated case
dealing with the applicability of the antitrust laws to certain agricultural marketing co-
operatives. See United States v. National Broiler Mktg. Ass'n, Civil No. 18173 (N.D. Ga.,
filed April 16, 1973). The consolidated action is presently in the pretrial stage, and in-
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